It may be that i'll end up posting a lot about Stoicism, but then again, maybe not.
I have a number of thoughts on this. There is the issue of Stoic physics and psychology and whether it fits with the way Western academics generally understand the nature of the physical Universe, and there is the matter of whether Stoicism is a good thing.
Firstly, the issue of Stoic physics. Some Stoics are not terribly concerned with the physics and divorce the philosophy of life quite neatly from it. Even these, though, probably assumed it. For the early Stoics, the two were inseparable.
This is roughly how i understand Stoic physics. It is physicalist and vitalist. There are no atoms or voids. The two eternal principles of Logos and Hyle are inseparable aspects of a single body, and the soul and God both exist and are physical. God is an eternal creative fire which is also found in humans, whose souls are also eternal. There is a more and a less refined fire. The distinctive human soul is pneuma, a mixture of fire and air. The less refined fire is not the eternal creative fire.
This is difficult to reconcile with contemporary Western physics. However, there may be another way, through the concept of prana. Breath is the lowest human need which can be voluntarily satisfied in Maslow's hierarchy. There are more fundamental needs such as for the heart to keep beating, but it is unusual for these to be subject to the will. Breath is special because it is both a reflex and a conscious action. Humans have, by a lucky chance, come across language, and this has made them distinctive from many other species. Human culture is based on language, and to the extent that thought is verbal, so is our special human consciousness, though not consciousness itself. Stoicism would concur if representations are seen as statements, and the Logos is rationality as the Word, that is, language. The historical basis of human language seems to be speech, though there are now other forms of language in which speech does not feature, and therefore breath is also absent, such as sign language and writing. I am therefore a little uncomfortable with this model because of the status of deaf experience.
There is another sense in which the soul is breath and fire. The central nervous system depends intimately on oxygen and differences in charge across membranes to maintain consciousness. Such a difference in charge is analogous to the refined fire known as plasma, that is, the fire of the sun and lightning rather than that of oxidation. The brain also needs a constant supply of oxygen to maintain consciousness, to a greater extent than the rest of the body. Therefore, the soul is in a very literal sense composed of fire and air.
The trouble is, what am i doing here? Am i merely painting a pretty picture of the soul, or am i saying something practically meaningful? I don't know. I do feel there is mileage in pursuing the notion of plasma as God. Another reason for disquiet is the nature of consciousness. It is reductionist and mechanistic to focus the seat of consciousness solely as within the central nervous system, and it doesn't correspond to my experience. I have irritable bowel syndrome. When i am stressed, this is expressed through my digestion. My colon contains millions of neurones. Similarly, i have gonads, a thyroid and adrenals. All of these are part of my consciousness. Therefore, I would say that my soul consists at least of a much larger portion of my body than just my brain. Although there is a blood-brain barrier, there doesn't seem to be such a firm line between my consciousness and the rest of me. Then again, the endocrine system and the enteric nerves rely on refined fire just as much as the brain does, if not on air. There is also a lot of scope in the notion of breath as the basis of the human soul through language.
Now to the other concern. Stoicism teaches indifference to the world and self-control. This means that one treats success and failure in the same way. Recently i have been very poor and found a Stoic approach helpful in coping with this. However, we recently received more money, and i found i was not particularly joyful about this, regardless of looking a gift horse in the mouth, something i'm very much in the habit of doing. Emotions are an important part of life, and i don't know that i really want to be cut off from the negative ones at the cost of also being cut off from the positive ones. Is this what Stoicism does or have i misunderstood?
Monday, 24 March 2008
Friday, 11 January 2008
Atheism 101 and Jainism
Here's an interesting series of videos:
http://www.youtube.com/profile?user=Doubter5
In case you don't want to watch them, they form a half-hour explanation of why the webmaster of digitalfreethought.com is atheist. I have no problem with his conclusion about Christianity, but also think his reasoning is rather different than mine would be, in interesting ways.
Firstly, the scientific method. Whereas i believe that scientific theory is useful and that the method can be a good way of refuting outmoded beliefs, i'm not sure about the contrast with magical thinking, because i see that as a precursor to the scientific method. For instance, both identify correlation as an element of causation, and there is cause for scepticism about causation in any case. Moreover, some people regard what they see as science or technology as the result of science in magical terms. They don't actually have a firm idea of how things work necessarily. For instance, my son knows that some electrical things work better when you turn them off and on again, but tried it with a lava lamp, which doesn't work. This is an example of magical thinking.
Concerning a hostile priesthood, this is where a difference between North America and Europe emerges. The priesthood are not always hostile. Certainly in the case of Pentecostalists, the Brethren and cell churches, there may be an abuse of power, but what of such movements as the Sufis, Quakers, Buddhists and in particular the Jains? This last group are particularly relevant to me because i live in Leicester, where Jainism is unusually prevalent, and i think it indicates a problem with identifying a particular, admittedly influential, branch of Christianity with religion generally. This is not to say there are not problems with all established religion, but Jainism is not like fundamentalist Christianity or Islam in many ways, which are actually analogous to less theistic ancient Greek philosophical perspectives, in particular Epicureanism.
The video quotes Epicurus, specifically his argument about God's omnipotence. The argument goes thus:
P=God is willing to prevent evil.
Q=God is able to prevent evil.
=> implies
v and/or (actually in this case XOR would work just as well but would be harder to type)
~ not
& and
P&~Q=>God is not omnipotent.
~P&Q=>God is malevolent.
P&Q=>The existence of evil is hard to explain.
~P&~Q=>This being is not omnipotent and therefore not God.
There are a couple of issues with this argument. One is that Stoics hold that evil is an illusion caused by failure to see the big picture or blessings in disguise, and they do believe in God. This argument also fails to rule out the possibility of supernatural beings with limited power, and Epicureanism and Jainism hold that these exist. However, their relevance to human life is quite limited in both. For Epicureanism, the gods seem to be good moral examples for humans, although in fact they may be included to avoid heresy-like charges from the authorities. Concerning Jainism, the gods are not to be worshipped or seen as examples, but it is possible to be reincarnated as a god, which is a dangerous position because of the corruption of absolute power. In these ways, Jain and Epicurean gods are relevant but not seen as omnipotent or worthy of actual worship or prayer. They are not considered important in the same way as the God of the Abrahamic religions is.
I would also take issue with the idea that people of different religions see themselves as worshipping different gods. The Abrahamic religions understand themselves as worshipping the same deity, and other theistic spiritual traditions frequently see the Abrahamic God as equivalent to their own high god or see their own lesser deities as manifestations of an ultimately single God. Therefore i can't accept this argument.
The question of human dignity is also problematic. It is an article of faith rather than something which is rationally argued for, and it may even be impossible to argue for it rationally. The behaviourist B F Skinner wrote a book called "Beyond Freedom and Dignity", where he argued that the notion of dignity, which he equated to moral agency (an arguable point) impaired the use of rational measures to improve society. Nevertheless, Skinner was undoubtedly a rationalist and an atheist. Similarly, the British philosopher John N Gray, also undoubtedly an atheist, sees human nature as an impediment. Freethinkers need to recognise this as an article of faith and also a perspective which is not shared by all people with a secular perspective. I personally believe in the possibility of a constructed human ecological niche and that although there is a human nature, it probably isn't relevant. Humans can be good or evil, depending on circumstances and background.
In the light of this optimistic view of human dignity, there follows a surprisingly pessimistic view of individual human capacity, in the statement "We have long since passed the point where the layman [sic] can scratch the surface of many of these fields", concerning such areas as Philosophy, biology, palaeontology and the like. The question of human ability to grasp the significant points of these disciplines is more an issue of time, learned helplessness, discomfort with social roles and the like rather than intelligence. People can in fact generally grasp what they need to in these fields, and at this point i should probably reveal that i home educate my children, which has led me to the conclusion that schooling is an inefficient form of helping children to learn which creates the long term impression that people's capacity for learning is much less than it potentially is.
I was pleased to see the mention of Giordano Bruno, who is the origin of my user name, but whereas he is commonly seen as a hero of freethought, it should be borne in mind that he was also quite influenced by Neoplatonism.
Concerning Buddhism, the interesting thing about this is that it doesn't have to be seen as requiring belief in reincarnation. Siddhartha Gautama himself analysed human essence into various components, none of which survived death except for the consequences of one's actions. I think it's a mistake to see Buddhism as necessarily believing in survival after death. It can be seen more as a psychological technology for achieving happiness. Even so, many versions of Buddhism have greater metaphysical overheads than just this.
Then we come to the question of religion and psychosis. I have flippantly defined religion and psychosis recursively thus: religion is collective psychosis and psychosis is individual religion. However, the problem with the label "psychosis" is that it denies the validity of phenomenology and hermeneutics. I'll have to go into this elsewhere, but it's a problem. Mental events defined as psychotic by others often have huge hermeneutic significance which is usually ignored, and the same may be true of religion.
It is also not the case that all religions make claims to truth, again because of Jainism. This religion includes the concept of anekantavada, which is the claim that no viewpoint has the complete truth except that of an unlimited mind, which does not mean humans. Therefore, Jainism effectively claims that it is itself not true.
Then we come to the issue of resurrection. Whereas it is an outlandish claim, it is not the case that it is unattested outside Christianity because of the first century Jewish scholar Josephus, who says of Jesus that "he appeared to them alive again the third day". There are arguments about the authenticity of this text, but the claim that there are no non-Christian contemporary sources is dubious. We need to be very clear of our sources and the justification for them before we make such claims, because otherwise Christians can exploit our errors in debate. Resurrection is also not clearly defined. Whereas Jesus coming back to life after three days seems to violate the laws of thermodynamics as we know them, the data available to observers with the technology of first century Judaea would lead to differences in the perception of whether someone was dead or alive.
Towards the end of the video, the statement was made that religion is divisive. This is again more true of the Abrahamic tradition than of some others. In fact, concerning Baha'i in even that tradition there is an attempt to bring different spiritual traditions together. In fact, the Chinese have often seen themselves as belonging to more than one religion at once. On the issue of subduing the "creation", again this applies more to Abrahamic religion than some others, but it has to be admitted that all traditions tend to place humans at the centre. I would also say, though, that humanism does the same.
Just a couple more comments. The notion of an apocalypse can only apply if time is viewed linearly. It does not make sense if, again as in Jainism but also in Stoicism, which is interesting because of its influence on Christianity, time is viewed cyclically. Many spiritual traditions do this and this undermines eschatology considerably.
Having said all that, there is certainly a teleological element in most spiritual traditions which is dubious and the problem of traditional, inflexible values remains.
http://www.youtube.com/profile?user=Doubter5
In case you don't want to watch them, they form a half-hour explanation of why the webmaster of digitalfreethought.com is atheist. I have no problem with his conclusion about Christianity, but also think his reasoning is rather different than mine would be, in interesting ways.
Firstly, the scientific method. Whereas i believe that scientific theory is useful and that the method can be a good way of refuting outmoded beliefs, i'm not sure about the contrast with magical thinking, because i see that as a precursor to the scientific method. For instance, both identify correlation as an element of causation, and there is cause for scepticism about causation in any case. Moreover, some people regard what they see as science or technology as the result of science in magical terms. They don't actually have a firm idea of how things work necessarily. For instance, my son knows that some electrical things work better when you turn them off and on again, but tried it with a lava lamp, which doesn't work. This is an example of magical thinking.
Concerning a hostile priesthood, this is where a difference between North America and Europe emerges. The priesthood are not always hostile. Certainly in the case of Pentecostalists, the Brethren and cell churches, there may be an abuse of power, but what of such movements as the Sufis, Quakers, Buddhists and in particular the Jains? This last group are particularly relevant to me because i live in Leicester, where Jainism is unusually prevalent, and i think it indicates a problem with identifying a particular, admittedly influential, branch of Christianity with religion generally. This is not to say there are not problems with all established religion, but Jainism is not like fundamentalist Christianity or Islam in many ways, which are actually analogous to less theistic ancient Greek philosophical perspectives, in particular Epicureanism.
The video quotes Epicurus, specifically his argument about God's omnipotence. The argument goes thus:
P=God is willing to prevent evil.
Q=God is able to prevent evil.
=> implies
v and/or (actually in this case XOR would work just as well but would be harder to type)
~ not
& and
P&~Q=>God is not omnipotent.
~P&Q=>God is malevolent.
P&Q=>The existence of evil is hard to explain.
~P&~Q=>This being is not omnipotent and therefore not God.
There are a couple of issues with this argument. One is that Stoics hold that evil is an illusion caused by failure to see the big picture or blessings in disguise, and they do believe in God. This argument also fails to rule out the possibility of supernatural beings with limited power, and Epicureanism and Jainism hold that these exist. However, their relevance to human life is quite limited in both. For Epicureanism, the gods seem to be good moral examples for humans, although in fact they may be included to avoid heresy-like charges from the authorities. Concerning Jainism, the gods are not to be worshipped or seen as examples, but it is possible to be reincarnated as a god, which is a dangerous position because of the corruption of absolute power. In these ways, Jain and Epicurean gods are relevant but not seen as omnipotent or worthy of actual worship or prayer. They are not considered important in the same way as the God of the Abrahamic religions is.
I would also take issue with the idea that people of different religions see themselves as worshipping different gods. The Abrahamic religions understand themselves as worshipping the same deity, and other theistic spiritual traditions frequently see the Abrahamic God as equivalent to their own high god or see their own lesser deities as manifestations of an ultimately single God. Therefore i can't accept this argument.
The question of human dignity is also problematic. It is an article of faith rather than something which is rationally argued for, and it may even be impossible to argue for it rationally. The behaviourist B F Skinner wrote a book called "Beyond Freedom and Dignity", where he argued that the notion of dignity, which he equated to moral agency (an arguable point) impaired the use of rational measures to improve society. Nevertheless, Skinner was undoubtedly a rationalist and an atheist. Similarly, the British philosopher John N Gray, also undoubtedly an atheist, sees human nature as an impediment. Freethinkers need to recognise this as an article of faith and also a perspective which is not shared by all people with a secular perspective. I personally believe in the possibility of a constructed human ecological niche and that although there is a human nature, it probably isn't relevant. Humans can be good or evil, depending on circumstances and background.
In the light of this optimistic view of human dignity, there follows a surprisingly pessimistic view of individual human capacity, in the statement "We have long since passed the point where the layman [sic] can scratch the surface of many of these fields", concerning such areas as Philosophy, biology, palaeontology and the like. The question of human ability to grasp the significant points of these disciplines is more an issue of time, learned helplessness, discomfort with social roles and the like rather than intelligence. People can in fact generally grasp what they need to in these fields, and at this point i should probably reveal that i home educate my children, which has led me to the conclusion that schooling is an inefficient form of helping children to learn which creates the long term impression that people's capacity for learning is much less than it potentially is.
I was pleased to see the mention of Giordano Bruno, who is the origin of my user name, but whereas he is commonly seen as a hero of freethought, it should be borne in mind that he was also quite influenced by Neoplatonism.
Concerning Buddhism, the interesting thing about this is that it doesn't have to be seen as requiring belief in reincarnation. Siddhartha Gautama himself analysed human essence into various components, none of which survived death except for the consequences of one's actions. I think it's a mistake to see Buddhism as necessarily believing in survival after death. It can be seen more as a psychological technology for achieving happiness. Even so, many versions of Buddhism have greater metaphysical overheads than just this.
Then we come to the question of religion and psychosis. I have flippantly defined religion and psychosis recursively thus: religion is collective psychosis and psychosis is individual religion. However, the problem with the label "psychosis" is that it denies the validity of phenomenology and hermeneutics. I'll have to go into this elsewhere, but it's a problem. Mental events defined as psychotic by others often have huge hermeneutic significance which is usually ignored, and the same may be true of religion.
It is also not the case that all religions make claims to truth, again because of Jainism. This religion includes the concept of anekantavada, which is the claim that no viewpoint has the complete truth except that of an unlimited mind, which does not mean humans. Therefore, Jainism effectively claims that it is itself not true.
Then we come to the issue of resurrection. Whereas it is an outlandish claim, it is not the case that it is unattested outside Christianity because of the first century Jewish scholar Josephus, who says of Jesus that "he appeared to them alive again the third day". There are arguments about the authenticity of this text, but the claim that there are no non-Christian contemporary sources is dubious. We need to be very clear of our sources and the justification for them before we make such claims, because otherwise Christians can exploit our errors in debate. Resurrection is also not clearly defined. Whereas Jesus coming back to life after three days seems to violate the laws of thermodynamics as we know them, the data available to observers with the technology of first century Judaea would lead to differences in the perception of whether someone was dead or alive.
Towards the end of the video, the statement was made that religion is divisive. This is again more true of the Abrahamic tradition than of some others. In fact, concerning Baha'i in even that tradition there is an attempt to bring different spiritual traditions together. In fact, the Chinese have often seen themselves as belonging to more than one religion at once. On the issue of subduing the "creation", again this applies more to Abrahamic religion than some others, but it has to be admitted that all traditions tend to place humans at the centre. I would also say, though, that humanism does the same.
Just a couple more comments. The notion of an apocalypse can only apply if time is viewed linearly. It does not make sense if, again as in Jainism but also in Stoicism, which is interesting because of its influence on Christianity, time is viewed cyclically. Many spiritual traditions do this and this undermines eschatology considerably.
Having said all that, there is certainly a teleological element in most spiritual traditions which is dubious and the problem of traditional, inflexible values remains.
Sunday, 23 December 2007
Textual note
It's common practice in the English language to write the nominative singular first person pronoun as "I" and second personal pronouns as "thou", "you" and so forth. This is very unusual. I am unaware of any other language which does so. In English itself, the oblique and genitive equivalents are written with a lower-case initial letter. Consequently, i write "i" rather than "I". It is fairly common also to write the second personal pronouns with initial capitals. I don't usually bring myself to do that. The reason i write "i" is neither laziness nor motivated exclusively by low self-esteem but out of a wish to be consistent with other languages.
Friendship and Romantic Love
First of all, let me record that i am a hypocrite. I have been in a stable, exclusive sexual relationship for fourteen years now, and i am emotionally very close with my partner.
According to Plato, love seeks completion and unity with the beautiful. For him, even lust is a form of love and is good because it forms the seed for a kind of love which is considered higher, namely love for a person's character. This assumes a difference between higher and lower things, but i'm going to have to leave that aside for the moment. Love could perhaps also proceed in the opposite direction, from love for character to love which includes attraction to the physical. Would this be a debasement? That would probably depend on the question of higher and lower things as well. I think these two directions, from the physical to the psychological and vice versa, tend to be associated with gender stereotypes, the first with the male and the second female.
There is another aspect of love, this time considered from the viewpoint of romantic love and friendship. Incidentally, it's quite hard to use the word "love" without the suggestion of romantic or sexual elements, which makes this passage somewhat difficult to write. For the sake of argument, i'll describe friendship as non-exclusive commitment and intimacy where attraction to physical aspects is discounted, and romantic love as exclusive, committed and passionate intimacy where attraction to physical aspects is considered relevant and has been or is being pursued. I'm portraying these as polarised ideals and ignoring issues of violation to simplify the issue. There are intermediate positions.
It's common among people i know to prioritise romantic relationships. Why? Romantic love can distract people from caring for others and leads them to make poor life choices. A celibate, single life could turn people's energy outwards to their friends and the world, and from a utilitarian perspective, there are more people in the world than in the relationship, and also probably more friends. Conflict between the interests or demands of partners and those of others would also be avoided. Given all this, i don't see what's so great about sexual relationships as they actually are rather than ideal ones, which may not exist.
If it's hard to avoid feeling lust, one may confuse friendship with lust and this may impair judgement. The answer may be to redirect sexual energy. This is often seen as negative, but Plato for one didn't see it this way. He saw it as transcending sexual desire, and the idea that this is a bad thing seems to have arrived with Freud.
If the option to redirect sexual energy is available, i would suggest taking it. There are so many abusive relationships, so many people looking inward rather than being there for friends or the wider world, and so many people whose judgement is impaired by the fact that they fancy people and, for example, lend too much weight to those people's opinions rather than others' and fail to recognise flaws and mistakes.
The value system behind what i'm saying here is consequentialist - based on ends. Contractarianism is another relevant way of looking at the situation. People place themselves under obligations, often implicitly rather than explicitly, in undertakings such as deciding to have a child together, live together, marry, enter civil partnerships and many other symbolic acts. I have missed out the word "voluntary". To what extent are these freely undertaken? People may see themselves as doing what's expected of them or confirm to a socially-derived view of being swept off their feet. There are cultural expectations, pressures under which one places oneself and decisions made in the heat of passion, not necessarily passion for the person to whom one commits. Where is freedom and informed consent in these undertakings?
Any thoughts?
According to Plato, love seeks completion and unity with the beautiful. For him, even lust is a form of love and is good because it forms the seed for a kind of love which is considered higher, namely love for a person's character. This assumes a difference between higher and lower things, but i'm going to have to leave that aside for the moment. Love could perhaps also proceed in the opposite direction, from love for character to love which includes attraction to the physical. Would this be a debasement? That would probably depend on the question of higher and lower things as well. I think these two directions, from the physical to the psychological and vice versa, tend to be associated with gender stereotypes, the first with the male and the second female.
There is another aspect of love, this time considered from the viewpoint of romantic love and friendship. Incidentally, it's quite hard to use the word "love" without the suggestion of romantic or sexual elements, which makes this passage somewhat difficult to write. For the sake of argument, i'll describe friendship as non-exclusive commitment and intimacy where attraction to physical aspects is discounted, and romantic love as exclusive, committed and passionate intimacy where attraction to physical aspects is considered relevant and has been or is being pursued. I'm portraying these as polarised ideals and ignoring issues of violation to simplify the issue. There are intermediate positions.
It's common among people i know to prioritise romantic relationships. Why? Romantic love can distract people from caring for others and leads them to make poor life choices. A celibate, single life could turn people's energy outwards to their friends and the world, and from a utilitarian perspective, there are more people in the world than in the relationship, and also probably more friends. Conflict between the interests or demands of partners and those of others would also be avoided. Given all this, i don't see what's so great about sexual relationships as they actually are rather than ideal ones, which may not exist.
If it's hard to avoid feeling lust, one may confuse friendship with lust and this may impair judgement. The answer may be to redirect sexual energy. This is often seen as negative, but Plato for one didn't see it this way. He saw it as transcending sexual desire, and the idea that this is a bad thing seems to have arrived with Freud.
If the option to redirect sexual energy is available, i would suggest taking it. There are so many abusive relationships, so many people looking inward rather than being there for friends or the wider world, and so many people whose judgement is impaired by the fact that they fancy people and, for example, lend too much weight to those people's opinions rather than others' and fail to recognise flaws and mistakes.
The value system behind what i'm saying here is consequentialist - based on ends. Contractarianism is another relevant way of looking at the situation. People place themselves under obligations, often implicitly rather than explicitly, in undertakings such as deciding to have a child together, live together, marry, enter civil partnerships and many other symbolic acts. I have missed out the word "voluntary". To what extent are these freely undertaken? People may see themselves as doing what's expected of them or confirm to a socially-derived view of being swept off their feet. There are cultural expectations, pressures under which one places oneself and decisions made in the heat of passion, not necessarily passion for the person to whom one commits. Where is freedom and informed consent in these undertakings?
Any thoughts?
Sunday, 25 November 2007
Supervenience and "negative herbs"
A property is supervenient when it is entailed by the inclusive disjunction of a set of properties but does not entail any one of those properties itself. I don't know if this is the same as an emergent property.
The notion of supervenience has been applied to mental events, ethics, evolutionary fitness and time. The relationship between high level and low level programming languages could also be seen as supervenient. There are various processes in herbal medicine which could be seen as involving emergence. For instance, there are "negative herbs": species of plant which reputedly have actions which none of the constituents have. This claim is sometimes made of Crataegus oxyacanthoides, hawthorn, and Verbena officinalis, vervain. There may also be synergistic effects: several herbal remedies taken together may have actions which are greater than the sum of the actions each would have when taken separately.
Sometimes, there is a clear explanation of an emergent action in a herb. One example is the lower toxicity of a whole herb relative to that of the alkaloids it contains. This is claimed of Symphytum officinale, and the explanation given is that tannins in the herb precipitate pyrrolizidine alkaloids from an aqueous solution and denature mediator proteins in the intestinal mucosa which would facilitate their absorption.
It may be possible to understand the action of some herbal remedies as supervenient over the biological activity of the constituent parts of the interacting living systems, which could often be considered as the plants and humans involved.
Orthodox medicine is often understood as aspiring to biological reductivism, since this is understood as a more appropriate method of analysing physical health and illness. This suggests that it is possible for a set of minds of widespread humanoid conscious cognitive features to approach medicine in this way. It would also be possible to give an account of an entire ecosystem purely in terms of physics and chemistry, but it seems to me that this would not generally be a helpful exercise. Similarly, although useful information can be gleaned from reductivism, it can also be gathered from consideration of supervenient properties such as synergy. Moreover, claims of emergent properties are clinically falsifiable. For instance, I can measure patients' blood pressures before giving them Crataegus oxyacanthoides, a reputedly negative herb, then measure it again at monthly intervals, then compare these to a control group. If i did this with sufficiently large samples, i would begin to corroborate a claim of a supervenient property with a clinical effect. This means that the notion of negative herbs is at least sometimes falsifiable in a conventional scientific sense.
What isn't clear to me right now is the relationship between supervenience, emergent properties and vitalist metaphysics.
The notion of supervenience has been applied to mental events, ethics, evolutionary fitness and time. The relationship between high level and low level programming languages could also be seen as supervenient. There are various processes in herbal medicine which could be seen as involving emergence. For instance, there are "negative herbs": species of plant which reputedly have actions which none of the constituents have. This claim is sometimes made of Crataegus oxyacanthoides, hawthorn, and Verbena officinalis, vervain. There may also be synergistic effects: several herbal remedies taken together may have actions which are greater than the sum of the actions each would have when taken separately.
Sometimes, there is a clear explanation of an emergent action in a herb. One example is the lower toxicity of a whole herb relative to that of the alkaloids it contains. This is claimed of Symphytum officinale, and the explanation given is that tannins in the herb precipitate pyrrolizidine alkaloids from an aqueous solution and denature mediator proteins in the intestinal mucosa which would facilitate their absorption.
It may be possible to understand the action of some herbal remedies as supervenient over the biological activity of the constituent parts of the interacting living systems, which could often be considered as the plants and humans involved.
Orthodox medicine is often understood as aspiring to biological reductivism, since this is understood as a more appropriate method of analysing physical health and illness. This suggests that it is possible for a set of minds of widespread humanoid conscious cognitive features to approach medicine in this way. It would also be possible to give an account of an entire ecosystem purely in terms of physics and chemistry, but it seems to me that this would not generally be a helpful exercise. Similarly, although useful information can be gleaned from reductivism, it can also be gathered from consideration of supervenient properties such as synergy. Moreover, claims of emergent properties are clinically falsifiable. For instance, I can measure patients' blood pressures before giving them Crataegus oxyacanthoides, a reputedly negative herb, then measure it again at monthly intervals, then compare these to a control group. If i did this with sufficiently large samples, i would begin to corroborate a claim of a supervenient property with a clinical effect. This means that the notion of negative herbs is at least sometimes falsifiable in a conventional scientific sense.
What isn't clear to me right now is the relationship between supervenience, emergent properties and vitalist metaphysics.
Wednesday, 21 November 2007
Universalism
Universalism means several different things. For example, it may mean the belief that all spiritual paths are a way to enlightenment, God or some other variety of ultimate concern. I assume this is not what is meant here, but the belief that a single set of values applies to all humans, regardless of ethnicity, gender or other categories.
This is how i see that in connection with human nature. There is, firstly, a categorisation problem akin to various forms of prejudice such as sexism and racism inherent in seeing it as merely applying to humans, because there are other entities towards which we have duties which are non-human, and probably even inanimate, so so-called universalism is actually too limited.
Leaving that aside, however, there is variation in systems of ethics which seems to render them incompatible. For instance, attitudes towards sexual and reproductive ethics vary hugely among cultures and traditions. Taking the values espoused in the Torah/Bible, the general thrust of the value system seems to be about promoting its own survival. However, the Jain system of values is completely non-evangelical and exists in a context where it sees itself as inevitably becoming extinct. These are examples of apparent incompatibilities between value systems. However, it does seem to be possible to identify certain themes behind the value systems, for example, utility (as in utilitarianism), ahimsa (non-violence) and justice. These themes can be arranged in a hierarchy, where for example two situations with comparable happiness can be distinguished morally by choosing the fairer alternative. Even so, they cannot be arranged in a hierarchy where one value is conclusively more important than any of the others, so the situation is like the game "rock - paper - scissors": nothing is on top. This is known as a non-transitive hierarchy.
I believe that the explanation for this is that there is another set of ethical principles which determine the nature of value systems, but which are not conceivable to the human mind, but whose existence can be deduced from the fact that values appear to be incommensurable. Ultimately, there are universal values, but they are inconceivable. I don't think their existence commits one to belief in God, although that is one solution. They are more like linguistic universals, but unlike them, they are not quantifiable. Also, they differ from a Chomskian understanding of the nature of linguistic universals in that although they are like a "deep grammar", this does not necessarily reflect any physical structure of the central nervous system. They are more like the foundations of mathematics.
So, i think that part of the human condition, i.e. human nature, is to find a value system. This is often decided by the conventions of one's community or society, but it can go beyond that and still be ethical. Having said that, there are humans who lack a moral dimension, for instance those described as dyssocial or psychopaths, and possibly also those on the autistic spectrum.
This is how i see that in connection with human nature. There is, firstly, a categorisation problem akin to various forms of prejudice such as sexism and racism inherent in seeing it as merely applying to humans, because there are other entities towards which we have duties which are non-human, and probably even inanimate, so so-called universalism is actually too limited.
Leaving that aside, however, there is variation in systems of ethics which seems to render them incompatible. For instance, attitudes towards sexual and reproductive ethics vary hugely among cultures and traditions. Taking the values espoused in the Torah/Bible, the general thrust of the value system seems to be about promoting its own survival. However, the Jain system of values is completely non-evangelical and exists in a context where it sees itself as inevitably becoming extinct. These are examples of apparent incompatibilities between value systems. However, it does seem to be possible to identify certain themes behind the value systems, for example, utility (as in utilitarianism), ahimsa (non-violence) and justice. These themes can be arranged in a hierarchy, where for example two situations with comparable happiness can be distinguished morally by choosing the fairer alternative. Even so, they cannot be arranged in a hierarchy where one value is conclusively more important than any of the others, so the situation is like the game "rock - paper - scissors": nothing is on top. This is known as a non-transitive hierarchy.
I believe that the explanation for this is that there is another set of ethical principles which determine the nature of value systems, but which are not conceivable to the human mind, but whose existence can be deduced from the fact that values appear to be incommensurable. Ultimately, there are universal values, but they are inconceivable. I don't think their existence commits one to belief in God, although that is one solution. They are more like linguistic universals, but unlike them, they are not quantifiable. Also, they differ from a Chomskian understanding of the nature of linguistic universals in that although they are like a "deep grammar", this does not necessarily reflect any physical structure of the central nervous system. They are more like the foundations of mathematics.
So, i think that part of the human condition, i.e. human nature, is to find a value system. This is often decided by the conventions of one's community or society, but it can go beyond that and still be ethical. Having said that, there are humans who lack a moral dimension, for instance those described as dyssocial or psychopaths, and possibly also those on the autistic spectrum.
Sunday, 18 November 2007
Utilitarianism and environmental ethics
I have generally seen environmental ethics in terms of duty to non-humans, such as the planet, the biosphere and inanimate objects as well as those who are less controversially aware and therefore presumed to be capable of suffering and pleasure, but utilitarianism may also be relevant.
I would say it could be relevant in two main ways. Firstly, the capacity for suffering and pleasure in living organisms could provide a huge environment compared to human population, depending on how far consciousness can be attributed to non-human organisms. If the population of relevant non-human animals is greater than the human population, their suffering becomes highly relevant because it could come to outweigh the pleasure available to the whole human population of the planet. For this to occur, it would only be necessary for rodents to be considered capable of suffering, which is not an outlandish assumption.
This does not, however, distinguish between higher and lower qualities of pleasure - qualitative utilitarianism, as conceived by John Stuart Mill. It seems plausible that either only humans or a small number of other species along with humans are capable of experiencing higher pleasures. If so, sufficiently greater weighting could be given to "higher" pleasures to justify the infliction of harm to members of other species incapable of such pleasures. However, this depends on the commensurability of higher and lower pleasures. If they can be compared, it suggests that there is another scale by which these pleasures can be compared, in which case, a greater level of lower pleasure could trump a certain level of higher pleasures. The qualitative division of the utility principle might also fail to apply to negative utilitarianism, which is the avoidance of suffering, and in terms of environmental ethics, the aim is the minimisation of suffering rather than the maximisation of pleasure. Qualitative utilitarianism can only be extended to negative utilitarianism if there is also higher and lower suffering.
The second way utilitarianism could be relevant to environmental ethics is that if humans are assumed to be the only beings capable of experiencing pleasure or suffering, they may suffer or experience pleasure at the quality of their environment or the knowledge that wilderness still exists. However, with a pastoral aesthetic, a particular cultural understanding leading to enjoyment of an environment which is in ecological terms impoverished, with, for example, lower biodiversity. That is, many people admire and enjoy well-kept gardens, parks and farmland which are relatively unsophisticated ecosystems. There is therefore a possible conflict between utilitarianism and environmental ethics. However, it may be that a different environmental aesthetic could give greater pleasure, although not in an aesthetic sense. If utilitarianism is qualitative, aesthetic appreciation could well be considered a higher pleasure, but if cultural considerations are left aside, this actually means that utilitarianism can be in direct conflict with environmental ethics.
Preference utilitarianism is based on getting what one wants rather than distinguishing between what one doesn't know would give one greater pleasure. This condition would, in general, apply to any conscious being rather than preferring humans, since if drives are associated with conscious desires in non-human animals, this is the relevant factor in how they should be treated as a group. This can be applied to dietary ethics, field sports and animal experimentation. In the first two cases, the argument is that the suffering inflicted outweighs the pleasure derived, and in the third, that it does not directly save human life. These arguments are Peter Singer's.
However, I am not a utilitarian. I believe that environmental ethics is largely based on duty to the planet or individual beings or aesthetic principles rather than utilitarianism. There is controversy over how far consciousness can be attributed: to certain humans, to hominids, to mammals, vertebrates and so forth: how far? Hence the question of whether they can suffer is controversial, and Jeremy Bentham's question does not have a clear answer. This clouds the issue of utilitarianism. Inanimate objects are often seen as beautiful but, more than that, many people have a sense that an act such as deforestation is wrong, and I believe this is regardless of whether any of the organisms in the ecosystem perceived to have been damaged suffered as a result. Imagine a virgin forest consisting solely of non-animal organisms. Most people would not attribute consciousness to anything living in that forest, and therefore would not regard any destructive act as causing suffering, but they would still regard it as wrong to destroy that forest. Nor is this due to the right to life of the organisms in the forest. A completely lifeless area of outstanding natural beauty, for example perhaps the Valles Marineris on Mars, would still have this status. It seems absurd to attribute rights to inanimate objects, so my conclusion is that environmental ethics is based upon the concept of duties to inanimate objects, and although capacity for suffering is a possible additional consideration, it is not necessary to have an environmental ethic.
I would say it could be relevant in two main ways. Firstly, the capacity for suffering and pleasure in living organisms could provide a huge environment compared to human population, depending on how far consciousness can be attributed to non-human organisms. If the population of relevant non-human animals is greater than the human population, their suffering becomes highly relevant because it could come to outweigh the pleasure available to the whole human population of the planet. For this to occur, it would only be necessary for rodents to be considered capable of suffering, which is not an outlandish assumption.
This does not, however, distinguish between higher and lower qualities of pleasure - qualitative utilitarianism, as conceived by John Stuart Mill. It seems plausible that either only humans or a small number of other species along with humans are capable of experiencing higher pleasures. If so, sufficiently greater weighting could be given to "higher" pleasures to justify the infliction of harm to members of other species incapable of such pleasures. However, this depends on the commensurability of higher and lower pleasures. If they can be compared, it suggests that there is another scale by which these pleasures can be compared, in which case, a greater level of lower pleasure could trump a certain level of higher pleasures. The qualitative division of the utility principle might also fail to apply to negative utilitarianism, which is the avoidance of suffering, and in terms of environmental ethics, the aim is the minimisation of suffering rather than the maximisation of pleasure. Qualitative utilitarianism can only be extended to negative utilitarianism if there is also higher and lower suffering.
The second way utilitarianism could be relevant to environmental ethics is that if humans are assumed to be the only beings capable of experiencing pleasure or suffering, they may suffer or experience pleasure at the quality of their environment or the knowledge that wilderness still exists. However, with a pastoral aesthetic, a particular cultural understanding leading to enjoyment of an environment which is in ecological terms impoverished, with, for example, lower biodiversity. That is, many people admire and enjoy well-kept gardens, parks and farmland which are relatively unsophisticated ecosystems. There is therefore a possible conflict between utilitarianism and environmental ethics. However, it may be that a different environmental aesthetic could give greater pleasure, although not in an aesthetic sense. If utilitarianism is qualitative, aesthetic appreciation could well be considered a higher pleasure, but if cultural considerations are left aside, this actually means that utilitarianism can be in direct conflict with environmental ethics.
Preference utilitarianism is based on getting what one wants rather than distinguishing between what one doesn't know would give one greater pleasure. This condition would, in general, apply to any conscious being rather than preferring humans, since if drives are associated with conscious desires in non-human animals, this is the relevant factor in how they should be treated as a group. This can be applied to dietary ethics, field sports and animal experimentation. In the first two cases, the argument is that the suffering inflicted outweighs the pleasure derived, and in the third, that it does not directly save human life. These arguments are Peter Singer's.
However, I am not a utilitarian. I believe that environmental ethics is largely based on duty to the planet or individual beings or aesthetic principles rather than utilitarianism. There is controversy over how far consciousness can be attributed: to certain humans, to hominids, to mammals, vertebrates and so forth: how far? Hence the question of whether they can suffer is controversial, and Jeremy Bentham's question does not have a clear answer. This clouds the issue of utilitarianism. Inanimate objects are often seen as beautiful but, more than that, many people have a sense that an act such as deforestation is wrong, and I believe this is regardless of whether any of the organisms in the ecosystem perceived to have been damaged suffered as a result. Imagine a virgin forest consisting solely of non-animal organisms. Most people would not attribute consciousness to anything living in that forest, and therefore would not regard any destructive act as causing suffering, but they would still regard it as wrong to destroy that forest. Nor is this due to the right to life of the organisms in the forest. A completely lifeless area of outstanding natural beauty, for example perhaps the Valles Marineris on Mars, would still have this status. It seems absurd to attribute rights to inanimate objects, so my conclusion is that environmental ethics is based upon the concept of duties to inanimate objects, and although capacity for suffering is a possible additional consideration, it is not necessary to have an environmental ethic.
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